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In any discussion of China policy two premises ought to
be agreed upon at the outset.

Unless they are, we will end by obscur-

ing the very issues which we are supposed to clarify.
First of all, China is not merely a group of political and
military chieftains on the island of Formosa.
Marxist~tb

a m'

it

Nor is it a few Chinese

L r in Peking, or--as they are at present--in Moscow.

We mean or should mean when we speak of China

theA~¢ sue million

Chinese people who possess a very ancient and distinct culture and who,
during the past half century have come to develop an increasing awareness of their national unity.

They constitute the China towards which

the friendly hand of the United States traditionally has been extended.
They are the China we have long sought to encourage in the direction of
democracy and freedom from foreign control.
In the second place, we ought to agree that China policy is
not solely the question of "to aid or not to aid" Chiang Kai-shek, but
rather the whole course of action and inaction in our relations with
that country.

The question we must ask ourselves is whether the course

we have set is the best that can be pursued under existing circumstances.
Does it serve all the interests of the United States?

Not merely our

commercial interests in China, although they are of some importance;
not mer ely our strategic interests in the Far East, although obviously
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those too are important--but the entire range of American concern
with China, the Far East and the rest of the world.
~...t.wo .:t:u~~•at.J...&e.-ets-1.!1
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retary Achesonvduring the

followed in

m1n1r,---ve Shdl f11ld;

tu~ -~ General

. . . .....< / of

administ~.on

Marshall and Sec-

President Truman has been

on the same bipartisan track ~ued by administration after administration
--Republican and Democra~during the past half century.
be kept on that

It should

espite the efforts of those, who for reasons of

...afw.t.~~M~~rr;1~1:it"ics, w~ld d.erail H.
little
So much heat and so/light has been shed on this policy by

the debate of the past few years that I should l ike to review briefly
just \ohat we have done and what we have not done with respect to
China.
During the war and immediate postwar period, the United States
extended both economic and military assistance to the Chinese.
.,..amormt-- ef that aeeietange ·.vee net large

en~gh

~

to satj sfy the more
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see~

6f our wartime leaders in \his respect

indicate that

we~

t~

decisions

at least rea fonably correct.

- 3 Assistance given to China during the war, limited though it may
have been, was the critical factor in saving a valued ally from colJapse
and I think it is a bout time we stopped being ashamed of it.
.....

~s

•reo ~vad..

terrible human

<:

Am~ee:e

~• -eb1&4Q ~the

sacrifiee~· demanded

qy the war. China's 1nterests also

were served since that country emerged from the conf{ic~ in a· stronger

and more independent position than itt had ever, be£01"e't. occupied- :11\ the

Partly to complete our wartime commitments and partly to equip
China for its greatly enhanced and important international role, the
United States continued aid to China during the months following the end
of the war.

The Chinese people wanted the removal of the 3 million Japanese

remaining in China.

They wanted internal stability and rapid economic

and political reconstruction.

And above al:}. they wanted an end to civil

war.

ese
any articular grou

them in war, t

General Marshall's mission
of the Chinese people.

a*•••

was in accord with the wishes

The General did not go to China to "force" Chiang

- 4Kai-shek to accept CommUnists into his Government as has been so
recklessly charged by some in this country.

He went to help achieve

what the Chinese people clearly and desperately desired--wha. t tre
Generalissimo and the National Government had repeatedly proclaimed
as their official policy--a settlement of the internal problem of
unity

~

peaceful means.
When it proved impossible to achieve such a settlement,

President Truman reiterated the traditional policy of the United
States--that we would not become directly involved in a Chinese civil
war.

That decision was applauded

~

the people of China, who were

overwhelmingly opposed to the suicidal conflict being precipitated

. ~t '~)
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Al!rex lean effoxts
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xaet- amorrtt and millions
in
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lhat it w s

clo~~T

The signifi ant

by sea and air 400,000

h-.

words have been wasted

, are the:;e:

During the first

~ the Uldrted States transported

o 500,000

Na~l

and around the Communist forces to key
The purpose of

pos-~ible

to one billion or to three billion.

~s,

few weeks after the de eat of

or-

It is

Government troops over
rs of East and North China.
orderly surrender,
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d repatriation of the Japanese.

Fifty thousand American

marines held such vital cities as Peiping, Tientsin and Tsingtao for
months, thus preventing their seizure P.r the Chinese Communists.
the end of 1945 ve had

deli~red

By

gufficient tonnage to equip 39 divisions.

of National Government ground forces and an 8 and 1/3 group air force.
Wh8tever Japanese equipment the Chine

Communists obtained vith the

facilitation of the Russians in Manchuria

as offset by the Japanese

equipment surrendered to the Nationalist forces

~n

North, Central and

South China.
In December, 1945, Chiang Kai-shek held a numerical superiority
in combat forces over the Communists of 5 to 1.

He had a monopoly of

heavy equipment and mechanical transportation and an unopposed

air arm.

Yet, by December, 1948, exactly three years later, this preponderance
of strength had been so dissipated that General Barr, head of our
advisory mission in China, vas forced to conclude

that without direct

American involvement with its combat forces, the complete defeat of the
Nationlist armies vas inevitable.
What lies behind this colossal failure?
from

Genera~Marshal l ,

Wedemeyer,

We have the answer
Barr and practically

every other competent observer vho has had the opportunity to view
the situation in China first hand.
lack of arms and ammunition.

The failure was due not to any

The failure was due to the incredible

ineptitude of the Nationalist Army command.

It vas due to the inability

or unwillingness of the Chinese Government to take the necessary and
repeatedly-advised measures of social, economic, political and military

- 6reform which alone could have ret ained for it, the support of the
soldiers and the common people of China.

It. was due to the

d~wnright

co:n;y.p:tion in o.fi'2c.ial circles. \ That .oorrup.'ti--en, a.ccording to the
magui.n& IJ. S. News and World Report, resulted in the diversion of

miallions. of

l

/is

Qt. U.S. aid,. int~J)ded for the ~e of the Chinese

:eeople, itp.ilo the personal fortun:)i! of those who held power.
of

th~oney
/

is

bac~ here ip ~the

Some

United States in private bank

/

'aesrounts at this 'Very mome"nt.)
In the face of the mass of evidence, there are still people
who cling to the theory that the Yalta Agreement is at the root of all
of China's difficulties.

It follows, then, that since we participated

in this dark and wicked conspiracy, we are guilty of some sort of gross
betrayal.
Let us see what this
vided.

much-w~ligned

agreement actually pro-

Under its most pertinent clause, the United States committed

itself to intercede with the Chinese Government in order to obtain t he
return to the Soviet Union of certain limited port and naval concessions
in Manchuria. They were substantially the same as had been lost ~
In return the Russians agreed to enter the war against Japan.
Russia to Japan in 1904./ They also reaffirmed their recognition of
China's sovereignty over all Manchuria; and consented to give assistance
and support to China exclusively through the National Government.
Military considerations were largely responsible for the
American decisions at Yalta.

It is all very well, with the wisdom of

hindsight, to ridicule these considerations.

But at the time, the war

- 7 with Japan was still of uncertain d:.tra.tion.

Without the unforeseeeble

impact of the atomic bomb on the outcome, hundreds of thousands of additional casualties might have been the price of the defeat of Japan.

The

administration wanted to share that toll as far as possible with other
countries.

No one, it seems to me, is justified in talking glibly of

such a. consideration.
The fact is that we could not have prevented, by any method
short of war, the penetration of Manchuria by Russian imperialism, so
we tried to limit it.

The American people have never indicated a. 'Willing-

ness to go to war for the ejection of non-Chinese control from Manchuria..
Our traditional China policy has never countenanced such a. step.

We did

not go to war when the Russians originally penetrated the area. towards
the close of the 19th Century.
replaced them in 1904--

We did not go to war when the Japanese

It was, as a matter of fact, President Theodore

Roosevelt, who arranged that first

11

Ya.lta.11 agreement.

And in 1931,

another Republican administration refused to lead us into war over this
issue when the Japanese expanded economic concessions into political
domination of all Manchuria..
We have placed on record in the past our conviction that Manchuria.
is Chinese territory.

At Yalta we did so again.

And we still believe

Manchuria remains Chinese territory, regardless of the advantages taken
by predatory neighbors in this time of China's weakness.

But the task

of restoring Manchuria to China in fact as well as in name is primarily
the task of Chinese Nationalism.

It is not now and it has never been

the responsibility of the United States armed forces.
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Rather than speak of Yalta as a gross and iniquitous
"betrayal", I think it is time to recognize it for what it was-the best possible chance, at the time, of preserving the long-term
interests of both the United States and China.
Another bogey has now made its appearance in connection with
the island of Formosa.

This time the Administration is accused, not

of betraying the Chinese, but of betraying the Formosans who, incidentally, are about 98 per cent Chinese.
At the Cairo Conference in 1943, the United States pledged
the restoration of Formosa to China.

There was practically unanimous

approval of that decision both in this country and in the Allied world.
when the war ended, the Formosan Chinese welcomed the return of the
National Government as a liberator.

Chen Yi, an old friend of Genera-

lissimo Chiang Kai-shek was appointed the first Governor.

Chen Yi

found living standards on the island better than on the mainland.

communists.

~

After a little more than one year of Chen Yi 1 s carpet-

bagging maladministration, the island was rocked by a fierce uprising
against the mainlanders.

Chen Yi crushed the revolt with a ruthless-

ness that claimed several thousand lives.
!Ml~l'lndsan.S"'
~

~~ ~~

net

15e!ieve the!'r 10t--15a'Cl as it might:

~rprising

that

ave been und&r •

J &Pfl!'Iese--WS" prefe'I'able to wnat they have su:ffe!'ed under -the

Wati"Onal Government.

,ve.
and more enlightened governors, Wei

Success~

Tao-ming, Chen Cheng and K. C.

\olu

have not been able to wipe out the

- 9 bitterness and hatred which the Formosan Chinese feel for their
oppressors.
It is

in~o

project ourselves.

this ugly situation that we are now invited to
Since a peace treaty with Japan has not yet been

signed, a legal loophole exists whereby we might assume some sort of
protectorate over Formosa.

In this manner we might conveniently avoid

or postpone in Chiang Kai-shek's int erest the pledge given to the
Chinese peopl e at Cairo.

This ignores the fact, however, that for

three years we have not questioned Chinese control over the island and
to do so now would be unabashed interference in internal Chinese affairs.
Th,Qr' "gun boat" policy for Formosa currently being advocated
in some quarters is not a new one.

It was first proposed a hundred

years ago by Admiral Perry and decisively rejected by the American
people then.

If we were to follow it now, we might be able with superior

force to discourage the present Communist masters of China from seeking
to take the island.

But in doing so, we would give credence to the

anti-American propaganda in the Orient that charges us with using our
power for imperialist purposes.
China-not~

\olQ

le!rdenrun-ii'ortHOS!!

noule eonf'ounti our

true

II lends

4.~t

ob1rt-tbe·-9h±ne!'e~ .w~~·-tht

VSX¥ momallt-et~& be-i~tg"· tc'M 'ffia~n~ 'lea:gtte wi"th' 'Cbi:!n-g-fuli-eflek

+.o.

]C'eep .~J.&~~

We would build, in the final analysis,

a lasting heritage of hatred just as the Russians are now busily doing
in Manchuria, Sinkiang and Mongolia.
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The situation in Formosa points up the key difficulty involved
in keeping our China policy on the right track.

We must discriminate

between what we can do and what we cannot do both in a material and an
ethical sense.

There is no virtue in doing in foreign affairs just to

be doing, and there are times when inaction is more effective from the
point of view of American interests than action.
The cardinal principle of United States China policy must remain
what it always has been--recognition of the fact that the internal problems
of the Chinese people, whether on the mainland or on Formosa, must be
solved primarily by the Chinese people themselves.
-arM-tflt!y"'\d-11-- not

.by ...r~igll'

a~ie1!1e&

T~

do not want

iftdefi:ni-t.e!y in solutions forced upon them

i'l'lte'ne~.

We cannot make ourselves responsible--militarily or otherwise-for a regime which has been abandoned by the Chinese people.

To do so

would be the certain way of diverting XXKtr attention from the real threat
to their nation arising in the North.
We cannot continue to supply armaments to a Government which,
the Communist leader Mao Tze-tung has callously, but unfortunately,with
much accuracy, labelled his supply ser vice for the delivery of American
equipment.
We cannot, by conducting naval exercises in the path of an
impending engagement in the Chinese civil war find a

che~

ment-free solution to the complex problem of China policy.

and involveIt is irres-

ponsible and dangerous to threaten force unless you are prepared to
use it.

And I doubt that even those who advocate such a policy are

ready to go to war over Formosa.
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We cannot on the other hand, give recognition

~

t<=t-,~

~'
government

which shows little regard for the rights of our citizens and little respect for even the most elementary international usages.

There vould appear

to be little point, moreover, in our association with a regime which claims
to speak with the authentic voice of China but which has the accent of the
Soviet Union.

At the conclusion of the present and unexpectedly long

talks in Moscow we may know better Whether that

regL~e

has abandoned the

()'\.

accent sa China 1 s fundamental interests.
at we
faith in

hi

~

do in the present cirau

-- not in

tances is to

~ h~full of exalted fi

We can

co~nue

m~ntain

our

to help those

sposal--through pJQlic anj private c

'

re

The Ch¥se{people will

forget acts

in their hour of ~al.
through the Voice of America, the United Nations
and other feasible ways, keep the attention of the Chinese and the world
focused on the Soviet exploitation that is now going on in China's remote
provinces.
p1s~~ amnuni t

agg~ess~ ve campai
By lending encouragement to l egitimate nationalist aspirations
and by extending practical economic assistance under Point Four to the
countries surrounding China, we can demonstrate our genuine interest in
the progress of all Asia .
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Finally, we can keep our thinking on general foreign
policy flexible.

Only in this way will we be able to act appro-

priately in any given circumstances.

Above all we must avoid the

fallacy of beli eving that consistency in foreign policy lies in
acting precisely in the same manner in every part of the globe.
It is, for example, fantastic to suggest that what we have done in
Greece we must also do in China, which has

~I

~

times as many people,

60 times as great an area and a vastly different set of political
and strategic problems.
The only consistency we need be concerned with is the
consistency with which we devote ourselves to the protection of
the security and all the legitimate interests of the United States.
\

That is the basic ingredient of a non-partisan, non-political
approach.

Beyond it let us exercise a little imagination and a

lot of discretion, .

